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Susan Sontag’s death was difficult: difficult forher because she fought it to a bitter end in atreatment regime that inflicted considerable
physical and mental suffering on her, and difficult,
too, for her son, David Rieff, as he testified in a
sober and affecting memoir of his mother’s death.1
By Rieff ’s account, he was agonized by his inability
or his refusal (he was never sure how to characterize
his failure) to tell his mother the truth about his own
evaluation of her grim prognosis, the utter futility of
her desperate medical treatments at the end, and the
burdens inflicted by those treatments on her and on
him.
In his memoir, Rieff powerfully described the suf-
fering that his mother endured as a result of her last
nine months of treatment for myelodysplastic syn-
drome, an especially lethal form of blood cancer. In
the aftermath of a bone marrow transplant, “her
muscles soon [became] so flaccid and wasted that she
was unable even to roll over unaided, her flesh in-
creasingly ulcerated, and her mouth so cankered that
she was often unable to swallow and sometimes un-
able even to speak.”2 When the transplant failed, a
powerful, unproven drug was administered to her
(apparently an off-label drug approved for a different
condition), but it was also unavailing. Following
Sontag’s death, one of her physicians wrote to Reiff,
“In her final weeks, she would often complain of ‘the
pain all over,’ and say ‘I don’t want any more.’ How-
ever if I tried to focus on palliation, she would im-
mediately bring the discussion back from this deep
despair to when and how we could continue her
therapy.”3
The standard model for end-of-life decision-making gives roles to two parties—the
physician, who explains the medical options, and the patient, who selects from among those options.
The model can be harmful not only for individuals but also for the state, if the patient’s right to
control her own choices is understood as a positive right of access to whatever is available. 
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This distressing chronicle frames
Reiff ’s account, but his central con-
cern throughout the book was
whether he bore any blame for his
mother’s suffering because he had
failed to tell her his own misgivings
(and even disguised from himself his
true conviction) that her final treat-
ment regime was bound to fail. If he
had admitted this before she em-
barked on her last desperate course,
he would have deprived her of
hope—“that poisoned chalice of
hope,” as he put it, which he “end-
lessly refilled.”4 And if he had admit-
ted his persistent doubts after these
treatments had failed, “it would have
meant saying to her, in effect, ‘your
sufferings are for nothing: you gam-
bled everything . . . but you’ve lost.’”5
Reiff tried to avert self-blame by
shifting the responsibility for his
mother’s treatment decisions away
from himself. “She was clear about
what she wanted and to the extent
that I am consolable about the role I
played, this is what consoles me: She
was entitled to her own death.”6 At
other times, he relied on her physi-
cians and their expertise. “Yes, her
chances of survival were small. But I
remember thinking at the time that I
simply did not have the right to be
more pessimistic about her chances
than her doctors were. And they were
going ahead with the treatment, pre-
sumably in the belief that it was not
futile, and that she was not wrong to
hope.”7
But Reiff never truly accepted
these maneuvers. His memoir is suf-
fused with ambivalence: whenever he
seems to grab hold of some reason for
concluding that he had behaved
properly, he quickly loses his grip and
slips back into self-recrimination,
swimming again in that sea of death.
Whether or not he had been truthful
with his mother, Reiff clearly strug-
gled to be truthful with himself in the
wake of her death.
The two self-exonerating claims
Reiff put forward—that responsibility
for treatment decisions rested on his
mother’s physicians because of their
expertise and on his mother, the pa-
tient, who had the clear right to
choose—are at the core of our con-
temporary social account about med-
ical treatment generally and the dis-
pensation of death specifically. Rieff ’s
account of Susan Sontag’s death raises
questions about the adequacy of the
dyadic model of decision-making fo-
cused narrowly on individual physi-
cians and individual patients, the
physicians cloaked in the trappings of
scientific expertise and the patients
armed with their rights. This essay
will explore the claims of others to
participate in this decision—the
claims of family members, as suggest-
ed by Rieff ’s account of his participa-
tion; and then the claims of third-
party strangers to the patient and her
physicians, such as government agen-
cies or professional associations.
The Participatory Claims of
Family
David Rieff clearly wanted to be-lieve that the entitlement to par-
ticipate in medical decision-making
belonged exclusively to his mother
and her physicians. But Reiff was un-
able to acquit himself of responsibili-
ty by relying on the conventional ac-
count of physicians’ responsibilities
and patients’ rights. This inability
arose because that account is, at its
core, not entirely believable. Reiff ’s
painful recounting of his struggle re-
veals the hidden fault lines in the con-
temporary account and points us to-
ward the possibility of some repara-
tive rethinking.
The core problem in the conven-
tional account revealed by Susan Son-
tag’s dying is that her physicians sup-
pressed their doubts about the effica-
cy of her last-ditch treatments because
they believed she wanted to exhaust
every therapeutic option, no matter
how remote its possibility of success
or how terribly she suffered in the
course of the treatment. Her physi-
cians’ unwillingness to forcefully ex-
press their doubts in turn reinforced
Sontag’s willingness to try even the
most desperate therapeutic possibility.
Her son’s account portrays this elabo-
rate shell-game of shifting responsibil-
ity that occurred between his mother
and her physicians:
On one level, the calming, and
sometimes even the emboldening
effect of what her doctors would
tell her seemed almost entirely irra-
tional since she was hardly being
told that her chances were very
good. To the contrary, when
pressed Stephen Nimer [Sontag’s
attending physician at Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in
New York] would be very frank
with my mother about just how
terrible her [blood cancer] was. It
is true that he never allowed him-
self to be drawn out on whether he
personally thought my mother
would survive or not (though she
repeatedly tried to get him to do
so, and asked me to ask him on a
number of occasions as well). In-
stead, he would reframe the ques-
tion, and in doing so, or so it
seemed to me, let the hope back
in. My mother would almost al-
ways take a deep breath, shake her
head, hair flying, and ask questions
concerning the next step Nimer
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wanted to take in her treatment.
They would go on from there,
with my mother growing visibly
calmer with the passing minutes.
To be sure, the successful dynamic
between them depended to a large
extent on my mother not digging
in her heels and simply repeating
the question about whether
Stephen Nimer thought she would
survive or not until he was forced
to reply to her either by his words
or by his silence. But she never did
anything of the sort, nor did she
ever inquire of me whether I had
in fact the posed the question to
Nimer myself as she had asked or
how he had responded.
Of course she did not want to know
the answer. . . . But it was more
than my mother’s fear or instinct
for psychic self-preservation that
determined the trajectory that
these consultations with Stephen
Nimer would follow. For in large
measure, I always felt, it was
Nimer himself who determined
this outcome. Somehow, . . .
Stephen Nimer managed to make
the question “unaskable” on some
deep level.8
This was not, however, Dr. Nimer’s
view of his interactions with Sontag.
Reiff asked him, after his mother’s
death, “Had he taken his lead from
her? Stephen Nimer did not answer
directly. ‘She was not ready to die,’ he
said. ‘As far as seeking treatment, I
knew from the first time I met her
that she would rather die trying.
There was also the feeling of loss of
control and of wanting to regain con-
trol. And I did think that there were
things to do for Susan. . . . Susan told
me from the outset that she wanted
me to do everything she could to save
her life, and so we could go straight
into a discussion about what she
wanted and what the plan would
be.’”9
For a moment in his retrospective
narrative, Reiff stepped away from
describing his involvement with his
mother and her physicians to recount
the views of another physician—
Diane Meier, a palliative care special-
ist at Mount Sinai Hospital in New
York—whom he consulted after his
mother’s death and who had not been
involved in her treatment.
[Meier] spoke of “the denial, the
kind of winking that goes on,
where, yeah, we all know the pa-
tient’s going to die but we’re all
going to pretend like there’s hope,
so we’re all going to go through
these rituals because that’s what we
believe that the patient wants. In
the meantime the patient is watch-
ing the doctor, who is offering this
treatment, and clearly thinking to
himself, if the doctor didn’t think
it would work he or she wouldn’t
offer it, but what the doctor’s not
saying is that the odds are minute
and that he is trying to be respon-
sive to the needs of the patient for
hope. It’s like a minuet. It’s surre-
al.”10
The consequence of the minuet that
Meier described is that no one can tell
who is acceding to whose wishes or
who wants what from whom. The
participants seem to play their parts
as prescribed by the dance protocol,
by the conventional account that the
physicians offer advice about poten-
tial benefits and risks and the patient
exercises her right to choose the
course of treatment. But observing
from the sidelines, it is impossible to
see who is leading whom; for the im-
mediate participants, this question
dissolves as they deferentially bow
and curtsy toward one another.
A further consequence of this
minuet is that others—Sontag’s son,
in this case—somehow can be exclud-
ed from the action or rendered mute
notwithstanding their vast personal
stakes in the outcome. This extru-
sion—or permission to withdraw—
can, of course, be welcomed as a self-
protective maneuver. But this dance
move is also encouraged, even script-
ed, by the conventional account. As
Reiff observed, he had no “right” to
challenge the physicians because they
were the experts, and he had no
“right” to challenge his mother be-
cause she was the patient. In the ab-
sence of any “rights” of his own, as he
understood the transaction, Reiff saw
himself entitled to say nothing even
though he was confronted by his
mother’s persistent demand that he
must say something. Reiff could
never figure out whether he should
speak honestly to his mother about
his own judgment of the worth of her
iatrogenic suffering or whether he was
obliged to swallow his doubts and lie
to her when she appeared to demand
some firm assurances from him.
To respond to this bind, Reiff ef-
fectively absented himself—or, in his
phrase, became “something of a
stranger” to himself.11 “The truth is,”
he said, “that I was afraid to feel any-
thing, not least because I was so
acutely aware of what my mother
wanted from me—to believe that she
would once more overcome the odds
and recover from her disease. To do
that, I had to not think.”12 The sad-
dest aspect of this “numbing,” as Reiff
terms it—this depersonalization of
his interactions with his mother—
was the emotional distance that it
bred between them as she moved ir-
revocably toward death. Near the end
of his book, Reiff observed that his
mother “who feared isolation and had
the most terrible difficulties connect-
ing with people had the loneliest of
deaths. It is on that account, and that
account alone, that I find myself
wondering whether the false hope
those close to her strived so hard to
provide her with in the end consoled
her or just increased that isolation.”13
It may be that Susan Sontag’s
death was more difficult than most. It
may be that other gravely ill people,
their immediate families, and their
physicians are able to negotiate this
balance between hope and truth in
more satisfying ways. Sontag was
never prepared to decline further
treatment, no matter how improbable
its success or terrible its imposition of
suffering. This is not the case for
every irrevocably dying person. It
thus may be tempting to conclude
that Sontag’s death and the legacy of
guilt afflicting her son for his ago-
nized part in it is an “outlier” case that
does not impeach the soundness of
our contemporary institutional
arrangements.
I believe, however, that there is a
systemic lesson that should be drawn
from Sontag’s death notwithstanding
its possible atypicality—a warning
lesson about harmful consequences
for dying patients and their families
that might follow from the contem-
porary uncritical embrace of the
rights vocabulary that shaped David
Rieff ’s understanding of his obliga-
tions to his mother and his renuncia-
tion of any obligations to himself.
The lesson is not, moreover, only ap-
plicable to the relationship of patients
and their families. The dominant vo-
cabulary of rights similarly structures
relations between physicians and their
patients in ways that can also inflict
injury on both. The lesson I would
draw is not that the vocabulary
should be discarded or that patients
wishes should be subordinated to the
independent judgment of their fami-
lies or their physicians. The lesson is
that the vocabulary should be used
with careful attention to the harms to
patients themselves—as well as their
family members and physicians—that
can accrue from its rote application.
There is no formal rule about fam-
ily participation that can easily be
drawn from this lesson. I would not
argue that family members should
have a right to impose or to veto
treatment decisions for the patient. It
might seem tempting to give formal
recognition to family participation in
decision-making—for example, by
providing an exception to the current
confidentiality rule, so that family
members are entitled to obtain the
same information that the patient
herself receives from her physician.
But this rule, if rigidly prescribed,
would not always clearly work to the
advantage of patients or their imme-
diate families (even if it were possible
to draft a workable statutory defini-
tion of the entitled family members).
Family participation should be under-
stood as psychologically and morally
desirable but not as a legal entitle-
ment—as a goal that should be urged
though not forced on both the dying
patient and her family. As David
Rieff ’s account demonstrates, howev-
er, the contemporary framework ap-
pears to exclude family members
from any recognized stake in the
event; the current “rights” vocabulary
serves to delegitimize and marginalize
everyone except the dying patient and
her physician. The current vocabulary
tells Rieff not only that ultimate au-
thority rests with his mother in mak-
ing treatment decisions but, wrong-
fully, that he is not morally entitled to
maintain and express his own inde-
pendent judgment about her deci-
sions.
The Participatory Claims of
Strangers
The “rights” vocabulary has recent-ly, though unsuccessfully, been
invoked to exclude governmental reg-
ulators from participation in deci-
sion-making by terminally ill patients
and their physicians. In a lawsuit
against the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, the Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs as-
serted that terminally ill individuals
who had exhausted all conventional
remedies had a constitutional right to
access experimental drugs that had
not been approved by the FDA.14
Overturning a prior ruling by a three-
judge panel of the court, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected this claim.
This rejection finds strong support in
Rieff ’s depiction of the vulnerabilities
of the patient-physician dyad in mak-
ing bedside decisions in the context of
terminal illness.
By statute, the FDA is required to
screen all new drugs and “medical de-
vices” to assure both their safety and
efficacy before they could be made
available for general medical use. The
Abigail Alliance specifically demand-
ed access to drugs that had passed
only phase I of the FDA’s required
screening. Phase I tests safety for
human use only in an exceedingly
sketchy, preliminary way, in trials typ-
ically involving fewer than ten sub-
jects. If no obvious danger appears in
the phase I trial, then the drug testing
proceeds to phase II, which involves
more subjects (though usually no
more than one hundred) and gener-
ates data about both safety and effica-
cy. If phase II demonstrates sufficient
plausibility on all scores, then the re-
search effort moves to a third phase,
involving a considerably larger patient
population. Only at the end of phase
III do the FDA experts decide
whether the drug is safe enough and
efficacious enough to be offered by
physicians to patients.
The FDA provides limited excep-
tions to this lock-step process. Under
pressure from activists in the early
1990s, the FDA approved a “fast
track” for earlier access to apparently
promising drugs to treat AIDS; and,
more generally, the FDA authorizes
“compassionate use” exceptions to cir-
cumvent its ordinary processes for
specific patients who have urgent
need and can make a plausible, even
though not entirely proven, case for
the utility of drugs still under investi-
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gation. These bureaucratically admin-
istered exceptions did not, however,
satisfy the Abigail Alliance plaintiffs.
They claimed that a terminally ill pa-
tient had the right to reach her own
judgment about the balance of possi-
ble benefits and possible risks and
that the government violated that
right by denying access to any drug
whose safety had been minimally ver-
ified by phase I tests. (It is not clear, as
a matter of principle, why the Abigail
Alliance plaintiffs accepted the FDA
barrier for drugs that had not cleared
phase I tests; perhaps, since phase I
involves minimal limitations, the
concession was a tactical demonstra-
tion of the plaintiffs’ willingness to
accept “reasonable” regulatory barri-
ers.)
The basic premise of the FDA’s
elaborate, time-consuming, and ex-
pensive set of hurdles before a new
drug or medical device can be ap-
proved for general use is that the sci-
entific practice of medicine is impos-
sible without an empirically proven
evidentiary base. Physicians, so the
premise goes, cannot make informed
use of drugs or devices, and patients
cannot give informed consent to
those uses, unless reliably gathered in-
formation about safety and efficacy is
available to them.
There are two related bases of re-
sistance to demands for rigorous em-
pirical demonstration of medical
therapies (whether for drugs and
medical devices subject to FDA ap-
proval or more generally envi-
sioned—though not statutorily re-
quired—by the new intraprofessional
demands for “evidence-based medi-
cine”). First, skepticism about the
need for rigorous empirical demon-
stration arises from within the med-
ical profession itself based on the
proposition that, aside from the diffi-
culties of designing adequate empiri-
cal trials of safety and efficacy for all
possible medical therapies, even the
most rigorous demonstrations yield
only statistical probabilities. Individ-
ual biological variations among pa-
tients are indeed so pronounced that
there can be no proof that a given
therapy will work for or inflict harm
on this particular patient. Statistical
demonstrations yield only variously
shaped curves, and there is no reliable
way to determine where on the statis-
tical curve a particular patient might
fall. (One of the most alluring
promises of new advances in genetic
understanding is for more precisely
tailored individual knowledge about
the risks and benefits of specific ther-
apies.)
The second ground for resisting
exclusive reliance on statistical proba-
bilities arises from a moral norm
about the unique worth of every indi-
vidual and the consequent right of
every individual to judge that worth
for herself, rather than submitting to
a collectively based judgment admin-
istered by some communal agency.
The scientific premise insisting on the
biological uniqueness of every indi-
vidual has strong connections with
this normative claim. In one sense,
the biological premise provides a sci-
entific basis for confirmation of the
moral premise. In another sense, the
moral premise provides the passionate
undercurrent for the resistance to the
utter dominance of “evidence-based
medicine” among some physicians
and patients alike. From both per-
spectives, the resonant claim emerges
that each person’s life is unique and
special and should not be viewed sim-
ply or even primarily as a member of
a communal collectivity.
Shortly after David Reiff pub-
lished his memoir, he wrote an article
for the New York Times Magazine ex-
plaining the justification offered by
his mother’s physicians for disregard-
ing the grim statistics against her
prospects for survival. Perhaps be-
cause he was writing for a general
reading public, Reiff may have over-
stated or oversimplified what the
physicians had said to him; but what
Reiff reported, or believed that he had
heard, reveals the connection between
the resistance to “evidence-based
medicine” and the claim of an indi-
vidual right to control one’s own
medical treatment that was put for-
ward by the plaintiffs in the Abigail
Alliance case. Reiff stated,
What my mother wanted—which
was to undergo any treatment, no
matter how terrible, that promised
a cure for her disease—would
probably have been viewed skepti-
cally by a physician schooled in
what [Dr. Jerome] Groopman calls
the “bean counting” of evidence-
based medicine. But doctors like
Nimer and Groopman hold that
their mission is to try to treat their
patients as their patients want to
be treated until doing so can be
called with assurance (rather than
in terms of medical probability)
medically futile.15
There is an unacknowledged contra-
diction in this position. If “assurance”
regarding the prospects for cure is not
based on “medical probability”—is
based on something other than statis-
tical “bean counting,” in Groopman’s
dismissive phrase—then there is
never a basis for acknowledging med-
ical futility, never a moment when the
premise of individual uniqueness and
its implication that this patient might
fall at the extreme end of the statisti-
cally rendered probability curve can
be overridden. Nothing, that is, can
be “called with assurance (rather than
in terms of medical probability) med-
ically futile.”
The underlying implication of this
position is that physicians should give
unlimited deference to the patient’s
wishes regardless of the statistically
demonstrated likelihood of therapeu-
tic success. There might be nothing
wrong with the application of this
premise—indeed, it might be a basis
for celebration as physician’s respect
for thoroughgoing patient self-deter-
mination—except for one problem.
The problem is not the waste of social
resources in providing treatments that
lack any empirically demonstrable
chance of success, unless our norms
permit a physician to engage in bed-
side rationing that sacrifices the inter-
ests of her individual patient to the
need for preserving communal re-
sources. Some argue that we should
H A S T I N G S  C E N T E R  R E P O R T 43March-April 2009
indeed embrace this norm in light of
the extraordinary social costs involved
in medical care; but the position re-
mains controversial, at the least. The
uncontroversial problem with the
provision of empirically unproven
treatments is rather that the individ-
ual patient’s welfare might too easily
be overridden—indeed, that his right
to make a fully informed decision
about treatment might be compro-
mised—if his physician is willing to
deploy any treatment solely because
the patient requests it. The patient,
that is, might too readily discount the
iatrogenic suffering imposed by the
treatment merely because the physi-
cian expresses willingness to go for-
ward.
Rieff ’s account of his mother’s ex-
perience illustrates the core dimen-
sion of this problem. He knew his
mother’s chances were small, yet he
also thought that if her doctors were
still making treatment recommenda-
tions, then they must think she had
some reason to be hopeful, and he felt
he had to give way before them.
Obviously, I knew that not all the
doctors shared this view. My
mother had started out with Dr.
A., after all, and he certainly gave
her no reason to believe that there
was much that could be done. But
Stephen Nimer at Memorial
Sloan-Kettering and Jerome
Groopman did not seem to believe
that there was no sense in her
fighting even if she wanted to.
Who was I to insist that my dread
was more relevant than their ex-
pertise?16
The problem with this account, how-
ever, is that it was not clear to Nimer
and Groopman that they were relying
on their expertise rather than on their
understanding of what Sontag want-
ed. “‘Always assuming [the treatment]
is not medically futile,’ Nimer told
[Reiff ] at some point during [his]
mother’s last weeks, ‘if I can carry out
my patient’s wishes, I want to do
that.’”17 But the conception of “med-
ical futility” that Nimer apparently
applied was a null set; it had no em-
pirical basis and could not be falsified
by any empirical data.
The physicians’ professional role
quintessentially involves making pre-
dictions about the expected course of
patients’ illnesses and the likely im-
pact of therapeutic interventions on
that illness. Patients may demand pre-
dictive certainty, but physicians can
only offer probabilities insofar as they
remain true to their professional call-
ing. Diane Meier, the palliative care
physician whom Reiff consulted after
his mother’s death, identified this ten-
sion: “As a physician, you don’t want
to impose your quantitative, Carte-
sian view of probabilities on an indi-
vidual person who says, ‘That’s prob-
abilities, that’s not me. I’m a fight-
er.’”18 The problem is, however, that a
physician cannot step outside of her
statistical conception of probabilities.
Predictive certainty is the province of
magicians or priests. The interaction
among Reiff, his mother, and her
physicians became hopelessly con-
fused when the physicians appeared
to endorse Sontag’s wish to “beat the
odds” and thereby stepped outside
their professional domain without ac-
knowledging that they were doing so.
Sontag clearly wanted a miracle
cure. But the costs of pursuing that
wish were catastrophic to her. As Reiff
reports,
The crux of the matter was that
my mother’s illness and, as soon
became clear, the cumulative side
effects of her treatment, increas-
ingly had stripped her both of
physical dignity and mental acu-
ity—in short, everything except
her excruciating pain and her des-
perate hope that the course she
had embarked upon would allow
her to go on living. I knew that for
her the physical agony she was un-
dergoing . . . was only bearable be-
cause of this hope.19
And her hope was kindled—perhaps
not created but certainly reinforced—
by the willingness of her doctors,
draped in their mantle of scientific
expertise, to go forward with her
treatment. This is the “surreal min-
uet” that Diane Meier identified—
patient and doctor each deferring to
the other’s rightful authority to con-
trol treatment decisions, with neither
of them clear about who was deciding
what or for what reasons decisions
were being made.
This minuet would become even
more misleading for many more peo-
ple, even emptier of discernible con-
tent, if the plaintiffs in the Abigail Al-
liance case had prevailed. In Sontag’s
case, at least the terrible side effects of
her bone marrow transplant were well
documented; there was thus an em-
pirical basis for her to weigh the pos-
sible risks of going forward with the
treatment even though her calculus of
possible benefits was confounded by
the confusion of roles between her
The Abigail Alliance
plaintiffs claimed
that a terminally ill
patient had the
right to reach her
own judgment
about the balance of
benefits and risks
and that the 
government violated
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and her physicians. If the Abigail Al-
liance plaintiffs had secured access to
experimental drugs that had passed
only phase I trials, there would be
hopeless confusion—or, more pre-
cisely, nothing but unfounded
hope—on both sides of the informa-
tional equation. Unknown risks
would be balanced against unknown
benefits, and utterly unsupported
hope driven by an unrelenting fear of
death—what Reiff sadly called the
“poisoned chalice of hope”—would
therefore encounter no countervailing
consideration.20
Fear of death is so powerful in our
culture, and physicians are so habitu-
ated to see themselves as fearless war-
riors against death, that bedside con-
sultation between individual patients
and physicians is not a favorable site
for sensible decision-making in des-
perate cases where conventional ther-
apies have failed.21 It may seem nor-
matively attractive to conclude, as the
Abigail Alliance plaintiffs maintained,
that where the possibility of survival is
at stake, individual patients rather
than physicians—much less faceless
bureaucrats in a federal government
agency—should decide whether the
possibility of harm outweighs the un-
likely prospect of benefit. But as
Susan Sontag’s case demonstrates, the
likelihood of systematic distortion in
patient decision-making with conse-
quent self-infliction of terrible suffer-
ing driven by nothing but unsupport-
able hope is so great that an avowedly
paternalist intervention is justified in
order to protect desperate patients
against their own vulnerabilities.
This is the position that Congress
has taken in constructing the elabo-
rate FDA process of empirical valida-
tion that must be successfully com-
pleted before drugs or medical devices
can be prescribed by individual physi-
cians. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit was correct in up-
holding this statutory scheme. As
noted, however, no comparable gov-
ernmental structure imposes require-
ments for empirical validation of
medical treatments other than drugs
or medical devices. As a result, indi-
vidual physicians are much freer to
promote untested therapies, con-
strained only by the requirement of
patient consent and the minimal ex-
ternal supervision erratically available
through individual malpractice suits.
Within the medical profession itself,
there have been recent efforts to pro-
mote “evidence-based medical prac-
tice.”22 But the limitations of those ef-
forts are apparent in the extensive and
inadequately explained regional varia-
tion of medical practice across the
United States.23
The harmful consequences to pa-
tient welfare from this freewheeling
approach to decision-making about
medical treatments were starkly illus-
trated by the use of bone marrow
transplants for breast cancer for some
fifteen years until 1999. At its early
uses, private insurance carriers refused
to finance the treatments because
they were not empirically validated
and were thus subject to the standard
policy exclusion of “experimental
therapies.” Notwithstanding the ab-
sence of empirical validation, howev-
er, growing numbers of oncologists
prescribed the treatment for breast
cancer patients who had failed con-
ventional therapies, and some of these
desperate patients sued their insur-
ance carriers for breach of contract. In
these high-profile cases, many trial
judges ruled in the same way that
Susan Sontag’s physicians had
acted—that is, deferring to the pa-
tients’ desperate hopes notwithstand-
ing the absence of scientifically based
empirical validation (thus overriding
their own professional norms by ig-
noring the contractual exclusion of
such unproven therapies from insur-
ance coverage). Faced with these liti-
gation losses and the inevitable sym-
pathy generated by patients desperate
to prolong their lives, a consortium of
insurance carriers banded together to
organize and fund empirical study of
the safety and efficacy of the treat-
ment for breast cancer. After consid-
erable delay and difficulty in recruit-
ing suitable patients, a multicenter re-
search protocol completed in 1999
concluded that there was no demon-
strable therapeutic benefit for breast
cancer from the transplant proce-
dure.24 Beyond whatever social harm
resulted from these wasted social re-
sources, the thousands of patients
who accepted their physicians’ unsup-
ported recommendations during this
fifteen-year period were subjected to
terrible suffering based on false
hope—the same harm that Susan
Sontag endured from her unjustified
and unsuccessful bone marrow trans-
plant for a different form of cancer.
One might say, as David Rieff
concluded regarding his mother, that
these women with breast cancer had
an individual right to opt for a treat-
ment that they viewed as hopeful,
notwithstanding the consequent ia-
trogenic suffering. But if the hope
arises because of a scientistic mystique
surrounding the physician’s recom-
mendation, while the physician relies
on what she thinks her patient wants
rather than on the empirical valida-
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tion demanded by the application of
scientific standards to the practice,
then the stage is set for the “surreal
minuet”—the passing of the “poi-
soned chalice of hope”—that distort-
ed the interactions between Susan
Sontag and her physicians. Bedside
decision-making between individual
physicians and patients is not con-
ducive to preventing physicians from
straying outside their professional
competence or preventing patients
from confusing their desperate wishes
with their realistic prospects for med-
ical assistance. Communally orga-
nized protections are necessary to
achieve these protections—whether
through direct governmental over-
sight or delegated authority to profes-
sional organizations.
Within the medical profession it-
self, there is a strong traditional impe-
tus to defer to the decisions of indi-
vidual attending physicians. Institu-
tional processes for consultative deci-
sion-making—for example, semifor-
mal “tumor boards” where physicians
in cancer-care hospitals deliberate
about treatment alternatives—have
made some inroads on this traditional
culture. But these consultative
processes still remain essentially de-
pendent on the willingness of attend-
ing physicians to refer their cases. In-
traprofessional social pressure should
underscore the practical and moral
reasons for going beyond the individ-
ual patient-physician dyad for deci-
sion-making in the same way that so-
cial pressure should be deployed to in-
clude family members in decision-
making. Unlike family participation,
however, a clinching case can be made
for mandatory inclusion of the wider
community of physicians, and ulti-
mately of government agencies such
as the FDA, in prescribing profession-
al standards of practice.
War, it is said, is too important to
be left to the military; just so, death is
too confounding to be left to the iso-
lated decisions of individual patients
and their physicians. Bestowing legit-
imacy on a broader range of partici-
pants than the individual patient and
physician might lead us toward a
more inclusive moral vocabulary, and
one that will help appease the terrors
and ultimate incomprehensibility of
death.
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